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The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is one of the most successful stories of 
economic transition and integration among developing countries. Strong rates of 
economic growth since the early 1990s have been fueled by increased trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the subregion. This economic progress has translated into 
marked improvements in living standards and human development outcomes, and 
dramatic reductions in poverty. Unilateral policy reforms and greater economic 
cooperation through the GMS Program in particular have led to positive trade and 
investment growth. More recently, membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) and other preferential trading agreements have driven reforms. 
Despite these achievements, the trade policy reform agenda remains incomplete. It is 
important for the GMS members of AFTA to multilateralize their preferences in order to 
avoid trade diversion and deflection, and remain open to global trade. This should also 
be the objective of the various ASEAN+1 bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). 
Retaining a multiple-tier tariff system is unlikely to mitigate revenue loss, but could 
unnecessarily burden an already stretched bureaucracy, or lead to more rent-seeking. In 
order to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, diversification of both export 
commodities and markets are being considered. Intra-sectoral diversification of export 
commodities is likely to be more viable and less costly than inter-sectoral diversification. 
It is unlikely, however, that any rebalancing of growth from foreign to domestic demand 
would be required in the GMS countries in order to increase resilience to external shocks. 
 
 
Keywords: Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS); Cambodia; the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR); Myanmar; Thailand; Viet Nam; trade and investment; regional 
economic integration; regional trade agreements; economic diversification 
 
JEL Classification: F15, F59, O53 
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1. Introduction   
 
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is often described as one of the most successful 
stories of economic transition and integration among developing countries.
1 For much of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, while the rest of Asia was busy growing and integrating with 
the global economy, the GMS remained extremely poor and isolated—the outcome of 
years of conflict and central planning in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Viet Nam. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the 
“CLMV” countries began a gradual process of reform and liberalization.  
 
The CLMV countries’ transition towards a market-based system has allowed the GMS to 
reinvent itself as one of the most dynamic subregions in the world. In the last 20 years, 
the GMS has grown at a faster pace than the whole of East Asia and the Pacific, with 
much of this growth coming from the CLMV countries. While Thailand and the rest of 
Asia reeled from the impact of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the CLMV countries 
continued to post positive growth, given their limited connection to global financial 
markets at the time (Figure 1). While these countries were not as immune to the more 
recent global financial crisis (GFC), with sharp drops in growth that have begun to 
reverse only recently, this underlies a decade of growing openness and integration with 
the global economy. The sustained economic growth leading up to the GFC has been 
accompanied by a gradual shift away from agriculture, which has traditionally accounted 
for the biggest share of value added in the CLMV countries. Across the subregion, 
industry, manufacturing, and services now account for a bigger share of value added 
(Table 1).  
 
This economic progress has translated into marked improvement in human development 
outcomes across the subregion (Table 2). Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
constant 2000 $ has more than doubled in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam since 
the early 1990s. Infant mortality rates have declined rapidly in the last 20 years, while 
literacy rates have shown gradual improvement since 2000. Prior to the GFC, poverty 
rates—the poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day at purchasing power parity— were 
also falling dramatically across the subregion, but 2009 data from Thailand suggests that 
poverty rates may have increased temporarily in the wake of the crisis.  
 
Strong rates of economic growth have been fueled in part by increased trade and 
investment in the subregion. Since the beginning of the 1990s, increased trade has 
played a huge part in spurring growth in the GMS, with exports playing a critical role in 
the subregion’s recovery after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Just as trade has 
increased throughout the region, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have also risen 




                                                  
1    The Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Program was initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
in 1992. The original members of the GMS program were Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet 
Nam, and Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 2004, Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region of the PRC also joined the GMS. Due to the lack of provincial data for Yunnan and 
Guangxi, this paper focuses on the five member countries of the GMS.  2     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
 
 
These positive developments notwithstanding, a number of critical challenges continue 
to limit the subregion’s potential to reap gains from trade and investment. This paper 
explores these challenges and identifies key elements of the unfinished policy agenda 
that need to be addressed. 
 
The paper is organized into five sections. Following the introduction, Section II looks at 
the evolution of trade and investment policy and economic cooperation in the GMS 
countries, highlighting policy changes that have helped spur trade and investment 
growth. Section III brings together available data to examine the changing structure of 
trade and investment in the GMS. Section IV examines remaining challenges and 
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Real GDP growth (%, constant $ 2000)    Value Added as a % of GDP 








2008  2009 2010 1995  2009 
/1 1995 2009 
/1 1995 2009 
/1 1995  2009 
/1 
Cambodia -  6.9  8.5  9.9  1.9  6.7  49.6 35.3  14.8 22.6  9.5 15.0 35.6 42.0 
Lao PDR  6.1  6.4  6.0  7.7  7.5 8.4 55.7  34.7 19.2  28.2 14.3  9.3 25.1 37.1 
Myanmar 5.1  7.2  12.9  13.2  -  -  60.0 48.3  9.9 16.2  6.9 11.6 30.1 35.4 
Thailand 9.0  1.5  5.1  4.3 2.3 7.8  9.5  11.6 40.7 43.3  29.9  34.1  49.7  45.1 
Viet Nam  7.3  7.5  7.2  7.8  5.3  6.8  27.2 20.9  28.8 40.2  15.0 20.1 44.1 38.8 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
(developing)  
9.5 3.6  4.1  5.2  7.4 9.6  19.3  11.3 44.3  45.0  30.9 31.7 36.5 43.4 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Note: 
/1 Data for Lao PDR are for 2008.  
 
Source: World Bank World Trade Indicators 2009/10 and World Development Indicators Online, April 2011.   
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Table 2: Socioeconomic and Poverty Indicators 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion, 1990–latest 
 
Country/Region 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 $) 
Infant 
mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live 
births) 
Literacy rate, 
adult total  
(% of people ages 
15 and above) 
Poverty headcount 
ratio at $1.25 a day 
(PPP, % of 
population) 
1990 2010  1990  2009 
Cambodia 209.8





































East Asia and 
the Pacific 
(developing) 









GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity. 
 
Note: 
/1 Cambodia data for 1993. 
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2.  Evolution of Trade and Investment Policy and Economic 
Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion   
 
With the exception of Thailand, the GMS were closed off to external markets until the 
late 1980s. Since that time, trade and investment reforms have been an integral part of 
the CLMV’s efforts to move away from central planning and toward a market-based 
economy. The trade and investment regimes of the three countries have gone through 
several changes as part of the ongoing policy of transition toward market-oriented 
economies. The GMS has also been quick to seize opportunities for economic 
cooperation, and has been actively engaged in negotiations of preferential trade 
agreements.  
 
2.1.  Trade and Investment Policy: Early Unilateral Reforms  
 
The opening up of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam to trade and investment 
occurred almost concurrently in the late 1980s. Cambodia’s government was the first to 
embark on a market-oriented reform process in 1985. The Cambodian government 
abolished the state monopoly for foreign trade in 1987 and allowed the private sector to 
engage in foreign trade in 1989 (ADB 2006). The government also promulgated a liberal 
foreign investment code in July 1989, and a National Investment Council was set up in 
1991 with the task of reviewing all foreign investment applications.  
 
The outcome of these reforms was somewhat lackluster, however, and perhaps 
unsurprising given continued warfare within the country. As an outcome of the United 
Nations (UN)-led peace process, elections were held in July 1993 and a multi-party 
democratic government was established in September 1993. This helped accelerate the 
process of economic reform in Cambodia. The foreign investment regime in Cambodia 
underwent an overhaul in 2003. The revised Law on Investment came into force on 27 
September 2005, and represented a major attempt to equalize incentives for foreign and 
local investors, achieve greater transparency in incentives provided, and minimize 
distortions and delays arising from policymaker discretion. Meanwhile, quantitative 
restrictions on trade were abolished and import tariffs were progressively streamlined. 
 
In the Lao PDR, the process of transition to a market-oriented economy began in 1986 
with the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism, a major program of economic 
reforms. Tariffs were lowered soon after the reforms were adopted. A major reduction 
was implemented in 1995 when a complex multiple tariff rate system with a 150% 
maximum rate was replaced by a simpler six-band structure (ADB 2006). A Foreign 
Investment Code was passed in July 1988 and the Foreign Investment Management 
Committee (FIMC) was set up under the direct purview of the prime minister to act as 
the apex agency responsible for approving, monitoring, and promoting FDI. At the initial 
stage, the prime objective of the FDI policy in the Lao PDR was to engage foreign 
investor participation in restructuring state-owned enterprises. The Investment Code was 
supplanted by the Law on Promotion and Management of Foreign Investment in July 
1994, which was again substantially revised in October 2004. 
 6     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
 
Foreign investment is permitted in all business sectors, with 100% ownership allowed in 
most sectors, except in mining and energy projects in which the Government contributes 
to share capital or retains the right to buy a pre-agreed share of equity. In joint ventures, 
foreign equity participation is required to be at least 30% of total invested capital. 
 
The opening of the economy to FDI was part of Viet Nam’s doi moi (renovation) reforms 
initiated in 1986. Procedures for the approval of investment projects were streamlined 
and fresh investment incentives were granted under the Law on Foreign Investment 
enacted in 1996.  
 
Meanwhile, in the area of trade reform, Viet Nam enacted the Law on Import and Export 
Duties in 1988; in 1992, it replaced the original import tariff schedule with a detailed, 
consolidated schedule based on the Harmonized System of tariff nomenclature. The 
tariff structure was progressively fine-tuned, and the maximum tariff rate was reduced 
from 200% in 1997 to 113% in 2004. Viet Nam also abolished quantitative restrictions 
and converted to tariff rate quotas for some products (ADB 2006).  
 
2.2.  Membership in Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreements  
 
The adoption of these unilateral policy reforms set the stage for increased trade and 
investment in the GMS. However, recognition of the fact that these unilateral efforts 
could only achieve so much provided an important impetus for GMS countries to engage 
in economic cooperation agreements. These agreements have increasingly been used 
as a tool for overcoming constraints in infrastructure development and trade facilitation, 
as well as providing leverage for pursuing further economic reforms. 
 
2.2.1.  The Greater Mekong Subregion Program  
 
The earliest of these agreements was the GMS Economic Program initiated by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in 1992. The original members of the GMS program were 
Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Yunnan Province of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 2004, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of the 
PRC also joined the GMS. 
 
The GMS program is a classic case of market, as opposed to institutional integration. 
While institutional integration is characterized by legal agreements and institutional 
arrangements that promote preferential trade among members of the agreement, market 
integration relies on non-official institutions that provide public and quasi-public goods 
that reduce transaction costs associated with the international movement of goods, 
services, and other production factors.  
 
As a program of market-based integration, the GMS agenda has concentrated on the 
provision of physical infrastructure with public good characteristics (e.g., cross-border 
infrastructure). Indeed, essential infrastructure of all types remains underdeveloped in 
most of the GMS economies, and the GMS program has focused on overcoming this 
constraint. Initiatives such as the East–West, North–South, and Southern economic 
corridors are creating a network of roads that connect the region, reducing the cost of 
transporting goods and people from one corner of the region to the other. Options for  
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interconnecting power transmission and developing fiber optic transmission links—both 
covered through the GMS flagship programs on power and telecommunications—also 
fall within the geographic scope of these corridors.  
 
Apart from hardware in the form of physical infrastructure, the GMS program has also 
tried to address complementary software issues. A key initiative towards this end is the 
Cross-Border Transport Agreement, a comprehensive multilateral instrument that 
supports a range of measures to facilitate trade and investment, which in turn promotes 
integration. These include: 
 
(i)  one-stop customs inspection;  
(ii)  cross-border movement of persons (e.g., visas for persons engaged in 
transport operations);  
(iii)  transit traffic regimes, including exemptions from physical customs 
inspection, bond deposit, escort, and phytosanitary and veterinary 
inspection;  
(iv)  eligibility requirements for road vehicle cross-border traffic;  
(v)  exchange of commercial traffic rights; and  
(vi)  infrastructure, including road and bridge design standards, road signs, and 
signals (ADB 2009a). 
 
Emerging transport networks and economic corridors in the subregion are transforming 
its economic geography. Enhanced connectivity, along with cooperation in transport and 
trade facilitation, has been associated with an eleven-fold increase in intra-regional trade 
since the Program’s inception in 1992. Priority infrastructure projects worth around $10 
billion have either been completed or are being implemented. As connectivity between 
GMS countries improves, their linkage with the region as a whole is also enhanced. For 
example, when the economic corridors are completed, it should be technically feasible 
for goods to be transported by land from Singapore through Malaysia to anywhere in the 
subregion. 
 
While the availability of cheap and trainable labor in the GMS has been a key factor for 
promoting trade and FDI, it is not the only determining factor. The availability of a wider 
array of complementary inputs, including better trade facilitation and high-quality 
infrastructure and logistics, are critical in making the trade and investment environment 
efficient by world standards.   
 
Despite the achievements of the GMS program in this area, a lot more remains to be 
done. Tables 3 and 4 reveal considerable variation in trade facilitation and logistical 
performance across the GMS countries, with Thailand and Viet Nam performing better 
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Table 3: Export and Import Costs and Documentary Requirements, 2005–2010 
 
Indicator  Country  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cost to export ($ per container) 
 
Cambodia  736 722 722 732 732 732 
Lao PDR  1,420  1,420  1,750 1,860 1,860 1,860 
Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Thailand  848 848 615 625 625 625 
Viet  Nam  468 468 468 533 555 555 
Cost to import ($ per container) 
 
Cambodia  816 852 852 872 872 872 
Lao PDR  1,690  1,690  1,930 2,040 2,040 2,040 
Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Thailand  1,042  1,042 786 795 795 795 
Viet  Nam  586 586 586 606 645 645 
Documents to export (number)  Cambodia  8  11  11  11  11  10 
Lao  PDR  11  11 9 9 9 9 
Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Thailand  9 9 7 4 4 4 
Viet  Nam  6 6 6 6 6 6 
Documents to import (number)  Cambodia  12  11  11  11  11  10 
Lao  PDR  15 15 10 10 10 10 
Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Thailand  12  12 9 3 3 3 
Viet  Nam  10 9 8 8 8 8 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Online, April 2011.  
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Table 4: Logistical Performance Index of the Greater Mekong Subregion, 2009 
 
Indicator   Country   2009 
Logistics performance index: Ability to track and trace 
consignments (1=low to 5=high) 
 
Cambodia 2.50 
Lao PDR  2.45 
Myanmar 2.36 
Thailand 3.41 
Viet Nam  3.10 
    
Logistics performance index: Competence and quality of 
logistics services (1=low to 5=high) 
Cambodia 2.29 
Lao PDR  2.14 
Myanmar 2.01 
Thailand 3.16 
Viet Nam  2.89 
    
Logistics performance index: Ease of arranging competitively 
priced shipments (1=low to 5=high) 
Cambodia 2.19 
Lao PDR  2.70 
Myanmar 2.37 
Thailand 3.27 
Viet Nam  3.04 
    
Logistics performance index: Efficiency of customs clearance 
process (1=low to 5=high) 
Cambodia 2.28 
Lao PDR  2.17 
Myanmar 1.94 
Thailand 3.02 
Viet Nam  2.68 
    
Logistics performance index: Frequency with which 
shipments reach consignee within scheduled or expected 
time (1=low to 5=high) 
Cambodia 2.84 
Lao PDR  3.23 
Myanmar 3.29 
Thailand 3.73 
Viet Nam  3.44 
    
Logistics performance index: Overall (1=low to 5=high)  Cambodia  2.37 
Lao PDR  2.46 
Myanmar 2.33 
Thailand 3.29 
Viet Nam  2.96 
    
Logistics performance index: Quality of trade and transport-
related infrastructure (1=low to 5=high) 
Cambodia 2.12 
Lao PDR  1.95 
Myanmar 1.92 
Thailand 3.16 
Viet Nam  2.56 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source:  World Bank World Development Indicators Online, April 2011. 10     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
 
2.2.2.  Membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, World 
Trade Organization, and Free Trade Arrangements   
 
Soon after the launch of the GMS program, the CLMV countries sought membership in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).
2 Viet Nam became a member of ASEAN in 1995, the Lao PDR and Myanmar 
joined in 1997, and Cambodia joined in 1999. Myanmar, Cambodia, and Viet Nam 
became members of the WTO in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Meanwhile, the Lao PDR 
is at an advanced stage in negotiations for WTO accession.  
 
As members of ASEAN, the GMS countries are also parties to the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA). Unlike the GMS program, AFTA is designed to pursue institutional, 
as opposed to market, integration. In essence, AFTA is a free trade agreement (FTA) 
based on a legal agreement that prescribes tariff reductions on a purely discriminatory 
basis. The centerpiece of the AFTA proposal is the common effective preference tariff 
(CEPT). It differs from an FTA in that its approach is essentially by sector, making it 
more comprehensive and less cumbersome than the item-by-item approach of an FTA. 
The objective of the CEPT scheme is to lay the foundation for the creation of a single 
ASEAN market. Under the revised AFTA plan, tariffs of products in the CEPT Inclusion 
List
3 were to be reduced to 20% within a time frame of 5–8 years (beginning in January 
1993) before they were cut to 0–5%. This target has already virtually been realized 
among the six original members of ASEAN, including Thailand. 
 
The CLMV countries are also far along in the implementation of their CEPT 
commitments, with almost 80% of their products having been moved into their respective 
CEPT Inclusion Lists. Of these items, about 66% already have tariffs within the 0-5% 
tariff band (ASEAN  Secretariat 2010). The CLMV countries were granted extensions on 
phasing in sensitive products. All quantitative restrictions on sensitive products must be 
eliminated by 1 January 2013 in Viet Nam; 1 January 2015 in the Lao PDR and 
Myanmar; and 1 January 2017 in Cambodia (ASEAN 1999). 
 
In addition to the AFTA, GMS countries are also increasingly becoming parties to 
bilateral trade agreements, which have risen as multilateral trade talks at the WTO have 
stalled. Table 5 provides a summary of each GMS country’s participation in FTAs as of 
July 2011. As expected, Thailand has been the most active in pursuing FTAs among the 
GMS countries with 24 in total, 11 of which are currently in effect. Viet Nam follows with 
15 FTAs, 7 of which are in effect. Thailand’s FTAs involve a more diverse mix of trading 
partners, while the CLMV countries’ FTAs mainly involve countries within the Asia–
Pacific region (see Annex A for a full list of FTAs). Table 6 presents a summary of the 
major FTAs to which the GMS countries are signatories, primarily as members of 




                                                  
2    Myanmar has been a member of the WTO since 1995.  
3   Products excluded from the CEPT Scheme are specified in the Highly Sensitive List (e.g., rice) and the 
General Exception List.  
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Table 5: Greater Mekong Subregion Free Trade Agreements, as of July 2011 
 
  Concluded Under 
Negotiation 
Proposed Total Intra-Asia and 
the Pacific 
Cambodia 6 1 2 9  8 
Lao  PDR  8 1 2  11  10 
Myanmar  6 2 2  10  9 
Thailand 11  7  6  24  17 
Viet  Nam  7 3 5  15  11 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 




Table 6:  Summary of Major Free Trade Agreements Involving  
the Greater Mekong Subregion  
 












Date in Effect  1 Jan 1993  1 Jul 2005  1 Jun 2007  1 Dec 2008  1 Jan 2010  1 Jan 2010 
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ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; CER = Closer Economic Relations; CLMV = Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Viet Nam; EPA = Economic Partnership Agreement; FTA = free trade 
agreement; MFN = most favored nation; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: ADB Asian Regional Integration Center (ARIC), Philippine Information Agency, 2011.  
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3.  Changing Patterns of Trade and Investment in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion  
 
3.1.  Overall Trends in Trade and the Changing Structure of Exports  
 
Although trade growth contracted in real terms in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the GFC, 
in general, unilateral policy reforms and greater economic cooperation have led to 
positive trade growth in the GMS. This is true particularly for Cambodia and Viet Nam, 
where real trade growth has been higher than the average growth of trade for East Asia 
and the Pacific. The Lao PDR’s trade contracted in real terms in 2000–2002, but 
rebounded in 2004 (Figure 2). With the exception of Myanmar, trade openness has 
increased throughout the region, with trade as a percentage of GDP above 100% in 




Figure 2: Real Trade Growth in the Greater Mekong Subregion, 1995–2009 












Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam
 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Note: data not available for Myanmar. 
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Figure 3: Total Trade and Trade Openness of  
the Greater Mekong Subregion, 1990–2010 






















































































































































































































GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 2010; IMF World Economic Outlook database (downloaded from ADB Asian 
Regional Integration Center database)  
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The direction of trade over the past two decades suggests a marked expansion in GMS’ 
countries trade not only with the world, but especially among themselves (Figure 4).  
Cambodia’s direction of trade may be the only exception to this general trend. In the 
1990s, Cambodia’s trade with the subregion accounted for about one-third of its total 
trade, on account of log and timber exports. However, this share has since declined, 
largely as a result of a ban on log exports and the growing importance of the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) as export destinations. The PRC is also fast 
emerging as a major source of imports. The increase in Cambodia’s intra-GMS trade in 
the latter part of the 2000s could have been mainly the result of falling demand for 
Cambodian exports in the US and the EU, as a result of the GFC.  
 
The larger GMS countries, Thailand and Viet Nam, have shown modest increases in 
subregional trade. As might be expected, these countries trade predominantly with the 
rest of the world and therefore have more diversified partners. Japan continues to be 
Thailand’s biggest trading partner, although Japan’s share has been steadily declining in 
recent years and is likely to soon be overtaken by the PRC. The PRC is already 
Viet Nam’s leading trading partner, accounting for roughly 20% of its trade in 2010.  
 
The share of intra-GMS trade in total trade has traditionally been higher for the 
subregion’s smaller countries—the Lao PDR and Myanmar—reflecting both 
transshipment arrangements and limited commercial penetration beyond the immediate 
neighborhood. Between 2005 and 2009, trade within the subregion made up more than 
two-thirds of total trade in the Lao PDR, and more than one-third of total trade in 
Myanmar. These countries trade the most intensely with Thailand. During the same 
period, Thailand accounted for 83% of the Lao PDR’s total intra-GMS trade; this was 
even higher in the case of Myanmar at 98% (Table 7).  
 
Nonetheless, a significant portion of trade among the GMS economies is informal, 
involving small merchants or traders, and therefore not recorded. The nature of this type 
of trade makes it difficult to know its magnitude, but estimates range from about 30%–
50% or more of total recorded trade (ADB 2006).  
 
Changing demand for export products has helped transform the structure of exports 
from the subregion. In Cambodia and Thailand, there has been a shift away from 
primary commodities to labor-intensive manufactured goods. In Viet Nam, primary 
commodities still make up close to 30% of total exports, but there is a clear shift towards 
a more diversified export base. In the Lao PDR and Myanmar, there was a similar shift 
away from primary commodities in 2000.  However, this trend has since reversed due 
to increased external demand for primary commodities, particularly ores and metals in 
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GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion; ASEAN-5 = Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore; 
PRC = People’s Republic of China; EU = European Union; US = United States. 
 




Trade and Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion   |   17 
 
 
Table 7: Intra-Greater Mekong Subregion Trade Flows in 2005–2009 




PARTNER    
Cambodia  Lao PDR  Myanmar  Thailand  Viet Nam  Total 
Cambodia   4,574.3 3,019.9 5,962,341.6 4,684,913.9 10,654,849.73 
     (0.04%)  (0.03%)  (55.96%) (43.97%)  (100.00%) 
Lao PDR  559.1    0.0  5,738,012.4 1,162,376.7  6,900,948.29 
   (0.01%)    (0.00%)  (83.15%) (16.84%)  (100.00%) 
 Myanmar  4,646.9  0.0    14,541,620.3 209,493.3  14,755,760.48 
   (0.03%)  (0.00%)    (98.55%) (1.42%)  (100.00%) 
Thailand 7,400,939.6  8,775,583.1 17,879,321.7 8,979,088.2
/1  24,789,476.3 67,824,408.94 
   (10.91%)  (12.94%)  (26.36%) (13.24%) (36.55%)  (100.00%) 
Viet Nam  6,021,979.6  1,614,675.9 437,349.0  23,922,797.5   31,996,802.04 
    (18.82%) (5.05%) (1.37%) (74.77%)    (100.00%) 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Note:
 /1 Re-imports 
 
Source: UNCTADStat, August 2011  
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Figure 5: Composition of Greater Mekong Subregion Exports  































































































































Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE database.  
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Figure 6: Major Primary Commodities in Total Exports of the Lao People’s 
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Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE database. 
 
 
The shift towards manufactured export products has been most pronounced in 
Cambodia, where textiles and garments quotas from the US and EU led to the 
emergence of an extremely narrow export base dominated by clothing and footwear. In 
2010, clothing and footwear accounted for 88% of Cambodia’s total exports (Figure 7), 
with the bulk of clothing and footwear exports (80%) going to the US and EU markets.  
 
In Thailand, trade in machinery and other equipment comprised almost half of total 
exports in 2010. Production fragmentation trade has become a critical part of Thailand’s 
export dynamism. There are indications that Viet Nam is following suit, as the share of 
machinery and equipment in Viet Nam’s total exports has risen to 18% in 2010. At 
present, however, clothing and footwear and other manufacturing continue to make up 
the bulk of Viet Nam’s manufactured exports, accounting for 26% and 27% of total 
exports in 2010, respectively (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Major Manufactured Products in the Total Exports of Cambodia, 






































































































Source: UNCTAD COMTRADE database.   
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3.2.  Overall Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Along with trade, FDI to the subregion has also risen over the last 2 decades. In 2010, 
total FDI stock amounted to $209 billion, or 48% of total GDP. Cambodia and Viet Nam 
have FDI stock-to-GDP ratios well above the subregional average, with Thailand’s just 
slightly below it. In contrast, Myanmar’s openness to FDI has declined since 1998. 
Historically, Thailand has been the largest FDI recipient in the region, but Viet Nam has 
been catching up in the last several years (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Direct Investment Openness in 











































































































































































































































FDI Stock (US$ current in millions) Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
FDI = foreign domestic investment, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
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The source country composition of FDI in GMS countries is characterized by a clear 
regional bias (Figure 9). Investors are predominantly from ASEAN, Japan, the PRC, and 
Asia’s newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and 
Taipei,China. In Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Thailand, intra-ASEAN FDI flows made 
up roughly one-fourth of total flows between 2000 and 2008. Despite the predominance 
of ASEAN investors, however, the EU has also been an important source of capital for 
the Lao PDR (23%), Myanmar (33%), and Viet Nam (18%).  
 
As for intra-GMS FDI flows, data for 1995–2005 suggest that these have been important 
sources of capital for the smaller GMS countries, particularly the Lao PDR, where they 
accounted for more than one-third of total FDI flows, originating mostly from Thailand 
(Figure 10).  
 
That trade and investment are growing hand-in-hand in the subregion is no coincidence. 
Early signs of a trade–investment nexus are emerging whereby trade not only 
encourages investment, but investment, in turn, encourages trade. For instance, FDI in 
agriculture and forestry, mining, and hydropower projects has contributed significantly to 
export growth in the Lao PDR, while FDI in the garment industry has helped strengthen 
Cambodia’s clothing and footwear exports (ADB  2006). These are examples of a 
virtuous circle comprising trade and investment that links back to economic growth. 
 
 
Figure 9: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows into the Greater Mekong Subregion by 













GMS Cambodia  Lao  PDR Myanmar  Thailand Viet  Nam
ASEAN  EU Asian NIEs Japan PRC USA Others  Unclassified*
 
 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, EU = European Union, FDI = foreign direct 
investment, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, NIEs = newly industrialized economies, 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
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Figure 10: Share of Intra-Greater Mekong Subregion Inflows in Total Foreign 




FDI = foreign direct investment, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. 
 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GMS = Greater Mekong Subregion, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic.  
 
Source: ASEAN (2006). Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN, Eighth Edition. 
 
 
4.  Remaining Challenges and the Unfinished Policy Agenda 
 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted considerable progress in enhancing trade and 
investment policies and outcomes in the GMS. These gains notwithstanding, a number 
of critical challenges continue to limit the subregion’s potential for reaping further gains 
from trade and investment. Furthermore, the countries of the region have been subject 
to several external shocks recently, the latest being the GFC. How can these countries 
reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to such shocks? 
 
4.1.   Further Rationalizing Tariff Rate Structures  
 
The biggest challenge facing GMS countries in improving their trade performance relates 
to accelerating trade facilitation reforms and dealing with a wide range of non-tariff 
barriers that continue to interfere with trade flows. The need to deal with these issues 
and reduce trade costs is now widely acknowledged, and measures are being put in 
place to address them. Nevertheless, the traditional area of tariff liberalization should not 
be neglected as the reform process is far from complete. Furthermore, the increasing 
number of FTAs presents new challenges in rationalizing tariff structures and creating a 
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The opening up of the CLMV countries in the 1990s has led to significant tariff cuts. 
Table 8 presents the average CEPT and most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs, and the 
difference between the two, which is the margin of preference (MOP), since the year the 
CLMV countries entered AFTA.
4 The data clearly show a general trend of declining MFN 
and preferential rates, although reductions in the average MFN tariffs seem to have 
stalled across all four countries since 2005. With the exception of Myanmar, MFN tariff 
rates in the GMS in 2007 remain higher than the 9.6% average for East Asia and the 
Pacific. In addition, the MFN tariff rates in Cambodia and Viet Nam were higher than the 
12.5% average for low-income countries. 
 
With CEPT rates continuing to fall in line with AFTA commitments, this has resulted in an 
increase in their respective MOPs since 2005. The MOP in 2007 was almost 15% in Viet 
Nam, and around 7–8% in Cambodia and the Lao PDR. Thus, the newer members of 
ASEAN have chosen to operate a two-tier tariff system, with two rates for each tariff line.  
 
Table 8: Most Favored Nation and Preferential Tariffs in Cambodia, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam, 1998–2007 
 
   1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007
Cambodia MFN  –  –  16.46  16.41 16.41 15.81  14.26  14.25 14.18 
  CEPT –  – –  8.87  7.83 –  9.08  –  6.85 
  MOP  –  – –  7.54  8.58 –  5.18  –  7.33 
Lao  PDR MFN  10.34  10.33 10.33 10.34 –  10.33  9.71  9.71  9.71 
  CEPT  –  – 7.21 6.70  – 6.15  3.88  – 1.57 
 MOP  –  –  3.12  3.64  – 4.18  5.83  – 8.14 
Myanmar MFN  5.54 5.51  5.49  5.51 5.51  5.51  5.60 5.60  5.60 
 CEPT  –  –  –  4.81  4.81  4.26  4.29  –  3.36 
 MOP  –  –  –  0.71  0.70 1.25  1.31  – 2.24 
Viet Nam  MFN  4.47  12.43  13.08  15.80 16.03  16.81  16.81 16.81  16.81 
 CEPT  3.71  7.39  7.54  6.86  6.57 5.50  4.08  2.27 2.35 
 MOP  0.76  5.04  5.54  9.06  9.46 11.31  12.73  14.54 14.46 
 
– = data not available, CEPT = common effective preference tariff, MFN = most-favored nation, MOP = margin of 
preference, Lao PDR = the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source: Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas, 2011. 
 
 
This contrasts with the approach taken by the original members of ASEAN, which have 
opted to multilateralize the CEPT preferences for a large share of their tariff lines 
(Menon 2007). For Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, more than 80% of 
tariff lines had been fully multilateralized as early as 2002. Indonesia and the Philippines 
had fully multilateralized more than 60% of their tariff lines by 2002. For the remaining 
tariff lines, the MOP was less than 10% in all of these countries (Feridhanusetyawan 
2005). In a comparison of external tariffs of major FTAs, the World Bank (2005) finds 
                                                  
4   Data for Thailand is unavailable.  
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that only the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has lower external tariffs 
than AFTA. The low MOPs are confirmed by the low utilization rate of preferences. A 




Why have the original member countries been multilateralizing most of their CEPT 
concessions? The main reason relates to the desire to minimize trade diversion. When 
preferences are fully multilateralized, the MOP is zero as is the potential for trade 
diversion. Even if it is not zero, the lower the MOP is, the less potential there is for trade 
diversion. This approach also reflects the long-standing commitment of the original 
ASEAN members to the concept of open regionalism.  
 
Emulation of the approach taken by the original members would be in the interest of the 
new members of ASEAN. Indeed they will need to emulate this approach if they are not 
to be left behind, and if they are to succeed in deepening regional integration. 
Regionalism through ASEAN membership could provide the GMS economies with an 
opportunity to pursue multilateralism aggressively and thus allow regionalism through 
AFTA to be a building block, rather than stumbling block, toward free and open trade. 
This applies equally to the other ASEAN+1 FTAs that the GMS members of ASEAN will 
eventually participate in (Table 6), as well as the individual bilateral FTAs being pursued 
by each country (Annex A).  
 
There are reasons apart from minimizing trade diversion for why the new member 
countries should emulate their predecessors in concurrently bringing down external 
tariffs. The freedom of members of an FTA to set their own barriers against trade with 
nonmembers raises the possibility of trade, production, and investment deflection. Trade 
deflection occurs when imports enter the area covered by an FTA via the member 
country with the lowest tariff on nonmember trade. Trade deflection distorts the region’s 
trading patterns with the rest of the world and deprives the member country that 
eventually consumes the import of tariff revenue. In the case of the GMS and ASEAN, 
revenue is likely to be lost to a member like Singapore, which is virtually a free-trade port. 
 
Production deflection will occur if the manufacture of products containing imported inputs 
shifts to countries that have lower tariffs on the inputs because differences in tariffs 
outweigh differences in production costs. This is detrimental to economic efficiency and 
welfare since the pattern of productive activity will be based on differences in duties 
rather than on comparative advantage. The deflection of production may also affect the 
pattern of international investment. If differences in tariffs outweigh differences in 
production costs, tariffs will dictate investment decisions. Investment deflection will 
reinforce detrimental effects on welfare and efficiency associated with production 
deflection. Although the GMS economies may not currently be subject to much 
production or investment deflection because most are still not developed enough to 
compete with other ASEAN members for the same types of investments, they could 
avoid it in the future by multilateralizing their AFTA tariff preferences. 
 
                                                  
5   To put this in comparative perspective, utilization rates of below 50% are considered low in European 
preferential trading agreements (see Augier et al. 2005). 26     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
 
To deal with potential trade, production, and investment deflection, AFTA imposes 
domestic ASEAN content requirements based on rules of origin (ROO). These rules limit 
regional trade preferences to commodities that incorporate a minimum of 40% domestic 
ASEAN content. The ASEAN+1 FTAs would have their own ROO, as would individual 
country bilateral FTAs. These different ROO, combined with other FTA-specific 
requirements, such as differing inclusion, exclusion, and sensitive lists, underlie the 
costs associated with the spaghetti-bowl effect of overlapping trade agreements. 
Furthermore, application of these rules can only limit, but not eliminate, trade, production, 
and investment deflection in AFTA. Krueger (1995) goes further to suggest that these 
rules can lead to the “export” of protection. This occurs when a member country 
deliberately purchases a higher-cost input from another member rather than the lower-
cost alternative from a nonmember in order to satisfy ROO requirements and gain duty-
free access for its end-product exports. 
 
ROO are also notoriously difficult to police and the administrative burden can be 
substantial. Not only is the origin of a product difficult to determine in this era of 
increasing internationalization of production, but the transaction costs resulting from the 
extensive documentation associated with this cumbersome process can nullify any 
benefits coming from freer intra-regional trade. In many of the GMS economies, the 
administrative costs associated with implementing ROO or measuring domestic content 
could be crippling. 
 
Adoption of the nondiscriminatory approach to regionalism by the new member countries 
would maximize the extent and pace of their integration with the global economy. It 
would also simplify implementation of the tariff reduction component of the various 
upcoming ASEAN+1 FTAs (Table 6), and the other FTAs that GMS countries have been 
pursuing (Annex A). This is underlined by the fact that the completion dates vary across 
FTAs. For instance, the CLMV countries have to complete their tariff reductions by 2015 
for the ASEAN–PRC FTA, 2016 for the ASEAN–India FTA, 2018 for the ASEAN–
Republic of Korea FTA, 2017 for the ASEAN–Japan FTA, and 2020 for the ASEAN–
CER (Australia and New Zealand) FTA. Apart from avoiding trade diversion and 
deflection, the multilateralization approach would untangle them from the spaghetti bowl 
by doing away with the tedious and costly tasks of implementing ROO and measuring 
domestic content of their imports. This would be the best option.  
 
So, why have the new member countries of ASEAN resisted the multilateralization 
approach? It appears that the main reason may relate to concerns over potential loss in 
government revenue.  Indeed, the concern over loss of government revenue is perhaps 
the most significant issue associated with participating in AFTA for new ASEAN member 
countries. This is because these countries continue to derive a significant share of 
government revenue from trade taxes.  
 
Retaining a multiple rate tariff regime is being pursued in an attempt to offset, or mitigate, 
the anticipated revenue losses associated with AFTA, as well as ASEAN+1 FTAs and 
other bilateral FTAs. What are the likely revenue impacts of the multiple-rate system 
compared with the one-rate system? To answer this question, we need to look at (i) the 
costs associated with administering each system, and (ii) the likely change in tariff 
revenue collections associated with each system. We need to consider both the costs of  
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administration and the change in tariff collections because the relevant variable is the 
change in government revenue (not just the change in tariff revenue) associated with 
each system. 
 
The costs associated with administering the multiple-rate system are clearly going to be 
higher than with the one-rate system. If the multiple-rate system is going to be effective 
in practice, then customs authorities in new ASEAN member countries will have to 
measure the domestic content of all of their imports in order to determine which rate 
should apply. As we have already argued, measuring domestic content with accuracy is 
very difficult for any country, and it will be close to impossible for the new ASEAN 
members.   
 
Additional tariff revenue will only be collected if non-member country imports are levied 
the higher MFN rate. If there is a significant difference between the two rates, there will 
be a strong incentive for trade deflection. With trade deflection, imports from outside 
ASEAN will enter new ASEAN member countries through a low tariff country (e.g., 
Singapore).  
 
Creating a system whereby six or more tariff rates can apply to each tariff line, 
depending on the source, also increases the potential for rent-seeking behavior. It is an 
open secret that some portion of revenue associated with trade taxes is collected 
privately rather than publicly in the GMS countries. A higher MFN rate compared with the 
many preferential rates would provide a new avenue through which private rents are 
extracted, with no change to public customs revenue collections. 
 
In conclusion, the multiple-rate system is a second-rate system compared with the one-
rate system because it is more costly to administer, economically distortionary, and 
unlikely to produce a significant increase in government tariff revenue collections. It 
could also lead to increased rent-seeking behavior. Without a significant increase in tariff 
revenue collections, the increased costs of administration and the economic costs 
associated with trade diversion would produce an outcome that is inferior in welfare 
terms when compared to the one-tariff rate system. 
 
Moreover, tariff escalation remains higher than the regional average for agricultural 
goods in the case of Cambodia and Viet Nam, and non-agricultural goods in the case of 
Cambodia, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Table 9). This creates an anti-export bias by raising 
the effective rate of protection on final goods produced for the domestic market.    
 
In sum, there is an urgent need to rationalize tariff structures in order to address tariff 
dispersion as a result of the various FTAs so that trade diversion and tariff escalation 
can be minimized. 
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Table 9: Average Applied Tariffs and Tariff Dispersion  
 
Indicators 































MFN applied tariff - Simple 
average - All goods (%)  16.40  14.25  9.59 9.70 5.51 5.60  23.05 16.65  9.53  16.52 16.63 16.81 19.09 10.95  9.39 
MFN applied tariff - Simple 
average - Agricultural (AoA) 
goods  (%)  19.44 18.10 18.99 19.46  8.51 8.66  38.48  31.04 19.91 23.05 23.71 24.15 25.08 15.89 12.40 
MFN applied tariff  - Simple 
average - Non-agricultural goods 
(%) 15.93  13.66  8.17  8.22  5.05  5.14 20.81  14.57 8.59 15.52  15.56 15.70 18.21 10.22  8.97 
MFN applied tariff - Dispersion - 
All goods (%)  0.83  0.76  0.83  0.84 1.15 1.12 0.73 0.89 1.26 1.13 1.25 1.12 1.27 1.29 1.04 
MFN applied tariff escalation 
(diff, finished-raw) - All goods (%)  –  7.57  –  -2.68 – 1.39 – 6.42  0.79 – –  7.54  –  2.22 1.84 
MFN applied tariff escalation 
(diff, finished-raw) - Agricultural 
(AoA)  goods(%)  – 14.01 –  1.61  3.50  5.48 –  11.37  2.97 –  –  16.10 –  4.99  9.69 
MFN Applied tariff escalation 
(diff, finished-raw) - Non-
agricultural goods (%)  –  6.74  –  2.08  1.80  1.54 – 9.20  9.32 –  – 9.27 – 3.24  2.51 
MFN Applied tariff escalation 
(%  change, finished-raw) - All 
goods  (%)  – 69.39 – 
-
20.56 – 26.02 – 81.88  6.71  –  – 55.83 – 46.92  21.96 
MFN Applied tariff escalation 
(% change, finished-raw) - 
Agricultural (AoA) Goods(%)  –  128.8  –  8.30  47.30  89.25 – 82.63  13.19 –  – 95.48 – 80.72  80.81 
MFN Applied tariff escalation 
(% change, finished-raw) - Non-
agricultural goods (%)  –  61.50  –  30.04  42.86 33.69  –  221.3 250.5  –  –  90.06 – 78.68  66.97 
 
– = data not available, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, MFN= most favored nation. 
 
Source: World Bank World Trade Indicators 2009/10.  
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4.2.  Reducing Vulnerability to External Shocks: Issues of Diversification 
and Rebalancing  
 
There is a widespread perception among government officials and policymakers that the 
GMS countries remain highly vulnerable to external shocks. This concern manifests itself 
in calls for diversification of the export commodity base and export markets, and more 
recently, growth rebalancing. The GFC has simply hastened such calls. What, if anything, 
should the CLMV countries do to reduce this vulnerability? How valid are the proposals 
on diversification and rebalancing being put forward, and how should the region 
respond? 
 
It is true that exports from the CLMV countries are still concentrated in a small number of 
goods and markets. The data on the composition of exports presented in Section III-A 
and Table 3 bear this out. It is also true that these concentrations make the CLMV 
countries highly vulnerable to sudden changes in external demand, as the recent GFC 
demonstrated. Therefore, the increasing calls to diversify and therefore reduce reliance 
on a narrow range of export commodities and markets are not surprising. But how 
should the GMS countries go about diversifying their economies?  
 
First, how should countries go about diversifying their export commodity base? In 
answering this question, it is useful to distinguish between intra-sectoral versus inter-
sectoral specialization. In other words, should the diversification take place by shifting 
resources toward new activities within sectors, or through inter-sectoral resource 
movements? Inter-sectoral diversification would involve changes to the shares of GDP 
accounted for by the key sectors—agriculture, manufacturing, and services—while intra-
sectoral diversification could leave these shares relatively unchanged.   
 
In this context, it is important to recognize that there is a gradual process of 
diversification at the macro level that is already taking place naturally as part of the 
process of economic development. This is evident in the changing shares of GDP 
accounted for by the three key sectors over time, particularly the reduction in the share 
accounted for by agriculture and the corresponding increases in manufacturing and 
services (Table 1). The question then is the extent to which government policy should 
intervene to control or direct this process, or to hasten it. In this regard, pursuing inter-
sectoral diversification would require a greater level of government intervention—in the 
form of subsidies as part of a package of industry policy incentives—than intra-sectoral 
diversification. This is because the artificial relative price changes required to induce 
resources to shift across sectors would be larger than those required for intra-sectoral 
reallocations. 
 
There are a number of reasons why intra-sectoral specialization is to be preferred in 
pursuing a policy of diversification. First, the adjustment cost associated with intra-
sectoral specialization is likely to be much lower than inter-sectoral specialization 
(Menon and Dixon 1997). This is because intra-sectoral specialization does not require 
inter-sectoral factor movements. It is likely that factors of production can be moved more 
easily across activities within a sector, with greater similarity in factor intensities, than 
they can across sectors, where factor intensities are likely to vary more widely. Trade 
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export-oriented industries to import-competing industries, whereas trade expansion through 
intra-sectoral specialization might only require factor transfer within export-oriented 
industries.   
 
This is already being recognized by leaders and policymakers in the region. In a recent 
interview, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of Thailand highlighted the need for intra-
sectoral specialization within agriculture and services, downplaying calls to diversify into 
heavy industry, stating that ”(t)he strengths of our economy lie in agriculture and the 
country’s beauty, which attracts tourism.” He added that “it is (not) necessary that the 
country has everything from upstream to downstream industries. Some people say the 
automobile industry will have a problem if we don’t have a steel industry. But I don’t think 
this holds true, given the benefits of ASEAN cooperation.”
6 In short, there is room to 
diversify into a range of activities related to traditional sectors that should be pursued 
first. That is, it would be more sensible economically to consider activities related to 
agro-processing such as rice milling, for instance, before venturing into the manufacture 
of automobiles or airplanes.  
 
Apart from diversification of the export commodity base, there may also be a need to 
diversify export markets, so that there is less reliance on demands form a small number 
of countries. In this respect, the experience of GMS countries during the GFC does 
highlight the risks associated with significant dependence on extra-regional demand for 
exports, especially the US and EU markets. Although increasing the number of markets 
that GMS countries export to will reduce these risks, the GFC did nothing to invalidate 
the outward-looking, export-oriented growth strategies that GMS countries have been 
pursuing. This policy has delivered rapid and continuous economic growth, and resulted 
in substantial improvements in living standards and significant reductions in the 
incidence of poverty. Thus, the subregion should maintain its vital trade links with the 
industrialized countries and the rest of the world.  
 
At the same time, however, the transformation of East Asia from a relatively stagnant, 
low-income region to a dynamic, middle-income one suggests that intra-East Asian trade 
offers the promise of a new source of demand and growth (Estrada et al.  2010). 
Strengthening intra-regional trade will enable the region’s economies to exploit 
potentially large, but hitherto under-realized, gains from trade (ADB 2009b). Indeed, this 
is already happening for many of the GMS countries. In Figure 4, we can see this shift 
taking place. To a certain extent, the unexpectedly speedy and robust recovery 
occurring in the GMS countries reflects this shift in the geographical pattern of much of 
the region’s exports. With the exception of Japan, East Asia is undergoing a near V-
shaped recovery reminiscent of the region’s rebound from the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis. Given the relatively high shares of intra-East Asian trade among most of the GMS 
countries, they are in a good position to ride this wave of recovery taking place around 
them. 
 
The growth rebalancing literature suggests that a complementary strategy would be for 
each country to shift the sources of growth from foreign towards domestic demand (ADB  
                                                  
6   Reported in Diversity holds key to success, says PM. Bangkok Post. 11 October 2010. pp. 1.  
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Table 10: Product and Market Diversification 
 
Indicators 































No. of products 
exported 58.67  66.60  73  118.6 160.6  188  176 144.4  114 253.2 240.2  254 218.4 236.8  250 
No. of products 
imported  229.2 178.8  240 227.4  227  238 248.8 245.8  246 254.6 249.6 257.5  247  252 256.5 
Export product  
concentration index  35.04  40.32  35.47  29.27 33.10 32.72 27.18 29.58 43.52 10.03  9.69  9.10 20.81 22.53 22.53 
Share of top 5 
export markets of 
total goods exports  –  –  78.76  –  –  62.60 – –  77.36 – –  44.77 – –  52.75 
Export market 
destination 
concentration index  –  56.82  53.65 – –  31.87 – –  47.07  29.82  28.13 21.47 22.61 27.36 24.77 
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
 
Source: World Bank World Trade Indicators 2009/10  
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2009c). There is certainly a case for the PRC to do this, as well as a number of other 
East Asian countries that continue to run large current account surpluses. As far as the 
GMS countries are concerned, however, almost all of them are net importers of capital 
and run current account deficits. Furthermore, the contribution of net exports to growth in 
most countries is either small or negative. These factors suggest that any policies in the 
GMS countries designed to shift sources of demand from foreign to domestic markets 





The GMS is one of the most successful stories of economic transition and integration 
among developing countries. Strong rates of economic growth since the early 1990s 
have been fueled by increased trade and FDI in the subregion. This economic progress 
has translated into marked improvements in living standards and human development 
outcomes, and dramatic reductions in poverty. Unilateral policy reforms and greater 
economic cooperation have led to positive trade growth in the GMS. These include 
participation in the GMS Program, AFTA, WTO, and various FTAs.  
 
Despite these achievements, a number of critical challenges continue to limit the 
subregion’s potential for reaping further gains from trade and investment. The trade 
policy reform agenda in particular remains incomplete. The biggest challenges facing 
GMS countries in improving their trade performance relate to accelerating trade 
facilitation reforms and dealing with a wide range of non-tariff barriers that continue to 
interfere with trade flows. It is important that more traditional areas of trade reform are 
not neglected either, especially with regard to rationalization of tariff structures following 
participation in AFTA and other FTAs. In this regard, the GMS members of AFTA should 
work towards multilateralizing their CEPT preferences in order to avoid trade diversion 
and deflection, and remain globally connected. This should also be the objective of the 
various ASEAN+1 bilateral FTAs, as well as each GMS country’s bilateral FTAs. 
Retaining a multiple-tier tariff system is unlikely to mitigate revenue loss, but could 
unnecessarily burden an already stretched bureaucracy or create new avenues for rent-
seeking behavior. There is also an urgent need to address growing tariff escalation to 
remove the anti-export bias. 
 
The GMS countries have been subject to several external shocks in recent decades, the 
latest being the GFC. In order to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, diversification of 
both export commodities and markets are being considered. Intra-sectoral diversification 
of export commodities is likely to be more viable and less costly than inter-sectoral 
diversification. Trade expansion through inter-sectoral specialization is more likely to 
require factor transfer from export-oriented industries to import-competing industries, which 
would be difficult, whereas trade expansion through intra-sectoral specialization might only 
require factor transfer within export-oriented industries. Meanwhile, the growth rebalancing 
literature suggests that a complementary strategy would be for each country to shift the 
sources of growth from foreign toward domestic demand. It is unlikely, however, that any 
such rebalancing of growth would be required in the GMS countries in order to increase 
resilience to external shocks, given that most are capital importing countries and the 
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List of Free Trade Agreements Involving Greater Mekong Subregion 
Countries, as of July 2011  
Cambodia  
•  ASEAN Free Trade Area (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and 
In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-People's Republic of China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6) 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3) (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic   
•  ASEAN Free Trade Area (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and 
In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-People's Republic of China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6) 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3) (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Lao PDR-Thailand Preferential Trading Arrangement (Signed and In Effect) 36     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
 
Myanmar 
•  ASEAN Free Trade Area (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and 
In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-People's Republic of China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) Free Trade Area ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6) 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3) (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
Thailand  
•  ASEAN Free Trade Area (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and 
In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-People's Republic of China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) Free Trade Area ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6) 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3) (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  India-Thailand Free Trade Area ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Korea-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Lao PDR-Thailand Preferential Trading Arrangement (Signed and In Effect) Trade and Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion   |       37 
 
•  Pakistan-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and 
study) 
•  People's Republic of China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Thailand-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  Thailand-Chile Free Trade Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Thailand-European Free Trade Association Free Trade Agreement (Under 
Negotiation) 
•  Thailand-MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and 
study) 
•  Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  Thailand-Peru Free Trade Agreement ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  United States-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
Viet Nam  
•  ASEAN Free Trade Area (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and In 
Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Signed and In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (Signed and 
In Effect) 
•  ASEAN-People's Republic of China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Chile-Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement (Under Negotiation) 
•  Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA/ASEAN+6) 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3) (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Japan-Viet Nam Economic Partnership Agreement (Signed and In Effect) 
•  Korea-Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ((FA) signed/FTA Under Negotiation) 
•  Viet Nam-Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan Free Trade 
Agreement (Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
•  Viet Nam-European Free Trade Association Free Trade Agreement 
(Proposed/Under consultation and study) 
Source: ADB Asian Regional Integration Center (ARIC) Free Trade Agreement Database for Asia. 38     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 78 
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Remaining Challenges and the Unfinished Policy Agenda
In this paper, Jayant Menon and Anna Melendez examine the challenges that remain which 
limit the potential of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) to reap further gains from trade 
and investment. Over the coming years, these countries will have to implement numerous 
ASEAN+1 bilateral free trade agreements. To minimize the administrative burden and 
maximize economic benefits, these countries should multilateralize their trade preferences, 
thereby avoiding trade diversion and deflection, and remaining open to global trade. 
However, any rebalancing of growth from foreign to domestic demand would unlikely be 
required in the smaller GMS countries in order to increase resilience to external shocks.
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